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ABSTRACT
Corporate governance and risk management research continues to gain attention 
given the increasing cost of risk management and corporate governance failures, 
which often remain underestimated attributed by the complex intertwining of risk 
management and corporate governance in such failures. In response, regulators 
had increased the significance of risk management activities and the board’s 
overall oversight responsibilities on risk governance. Prior studies provided 
conflicting outcomes on the relationship of corporate governance elements and 
board’s oversight effectiveness. This study aims to ascertain board attributes 
(board independence, board committee structure, board experience, corporate 
reporting and disclosure, and dynamic and constructive dialogue adopted on 
risk governance matters) that contributed positively towards board’s oversight 
effectiveness on corporate risk governance. The findings based on top 100 Bursa 
Malaysia listed companies between 2011 to 2015 suggest that board committee 
structure, disclosure on risk management framework, and detailed disclosure 
of risk management practices and processes are significantly positively related 
towards board’s oversight effectiveness on corporate risk governance. However, 
other elements such as board independence, board experience, and dynamic 
and constructive dialogue on corporate risk governance do not contribute 
significantly. This study offers new insights on practices adopted by Malaysian 
listed companies on risk governance and help regulators to create greater 
awareness with respect to the intrinsic value derived from corporate risk 
governance practices, and to formulate director’s training and development 
programme to enhance effectiveness of board’s oversight on corporate risk 
governance. 
Keywords: corporate governance, risk management, corporate risk governance
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INTrODUCTION
over the past two decades, corporate risk management and governance 
failures have continued to dominate global headlines; partly contributed by 
the lack of adequate board-level risk management. This consequently led 
to heightening attention and initiatives to improve corporate governance 
standards and focus on risk management over the period of 2012 to 2014 
with reforms specifically concentrated on the directors’ role to enhance 
corporate governance and the board’s risk management responsibilities, and 
to reinforce the importance of director’s independence and clear articulation 
of the board’s risk oversight responsibilities (roberts, McNulty and stiles, 
2005; Germain, Gally and Lee, 2014). This is to ensure that boards are 
guided in their expanded remit, responsibilities and effectiveness on 
corporate risk governance. Although the agenda for increasing director’s 
independence has been ongoing, the attention on board’s risk oversight 
role and responsibility is an increasingly critical agenda. Additionally, the 
existing governance code reflects the perspective that risk management 
and corporate governance principles should be integrated in regard to the 
ongoing views that risk management should be a formidable element of 
corporate governance practices (McCrae and Balthazor, 2000; Woods, 
2009). Hence, the concept to embed risk management within the corporate 
governance scope requires further insights and studies with the objective of 
enabling boards to effectively exercise their risk oversight responsibilities. 
This will be further discussed and forms the basis and justification to support 
this study.
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (“MCCG”) was 
introduced in 2000 and enhanced in 2012 to focus on sub-committees’ 
roles and responsibilities, strengthening board composition, mandatory 
separation of the role of CEo and Chairman, and the adoption of internal 
control systems and risk management framework (securities Commission 
Malaysia, 2012). The enhancements were consistent to the international 
corporate governance guidelines1 refinements. Further changes were made 
in 2017 to further internalise the culture of corporate governance and the top 
100 companies are encouraged to establish risk Management Committees 
1 The international corporate governance guidelines include but not limited to the south African 
Kings III report, Australian stock Exchange Governance Principles (“AsX Principles) 2014, UK 
Corporate Governance Code (“UK Code”) 2014, and singapore Code of Corporate Governance 
(“singapore Code”) 2012.
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(“rMC”) to further focus on risk related matters. Compliance to the MCCG 
remains a challenge given the more onerous burden of responsibilities 
expected of public listed boards on risk management oversight. This has 
accelerated the need to realign corporate governance practices to embed risk 
management within corporate governance, and hence the focus on corporate 
risk governance. This therefore has necessitated greater appreciation and 
studies to enhance comprehension of the determinants of board structure, 
role and responsibilities to ensure effective corporate risk governance, and 
hence the focus of this study. 
Given the global corporate scandals, this further suggests that firms 
need to improve the effectiveness of board’s oversight responsibilities 
to protect stakeholders’ interests; namely its shareholders and investors. 
Coupled with the dynamic and competitive landscape, this increases the 
complexity of strategic decision making including matters in relation 
to corporate governance and risk management. Governance Institute of 
Australia, 2016 reinforced that “the oversight of the maintenance of sound 
risk management and internal control systems is core to the role of the board 
in steering organisations.” Malaysia is a developing economy faced with 
economic, regulatory and social-political challenges, and deterioration in 
its governance ranking2 (Yeap, 2016). Therefore, it is important to ascertain 
“which determinants will ensure an effective board’s oversight on corporate 
risk governance, and what are the contributory elements that enable a board 
to be more effective in its oversight role and responsibilities in corporate 
risk governance?” given the inherent challenges of firms operating in 
Malaysia. section 1 on literature review provides a discussion on previously 
published corporate governance and risk management research papers. This 
is followed by section 2 which includes a discussion on the methodology 
applied for this study and section 3, which embodies the discussion of the 
findings arising from this study and results thereof before concluding with 
a conclusion section.
2 In the biennial Corporate Governance Watch 2016 carried out for 11 Asia Pacific countries Malaysia’s 
ranking has dropped from forth in 2014 to 6th in 2016. The report adds that a key contributing factor 
for the decline was attributed to the Malaysian state fund crisis. 
MAR June 2017.indd   191 12/15/2017   9:14:49 AM
192
MANAGEMENT & AccouNTiNG rEviEw, voluME 16 No. 1, JuNE 2017
LITErATUrE rEVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Good governance has been widely recognised as a key contributor in 
improving overall economic efficiency. Prior studies have advocated and 
acknowledged that the practice of corporate governance varies and hence 
is unable to effectively function in a singular manner. Instead, governance 
practices differ across economies, firms, sectors, and nations (Black, 
Gledson de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim and Yurtoglu, 2014). Hence, the 
appreciation of the theoretical framework that sets the building blocks and 
principles of corporate governance is important. This paper focuses mainly 
on agency, stewardship, resource dependency, and contingency theories. 
Agency theory is primarily predicated on the alignment of proprietors 
and managers’ interests premised on the underlying conflict of interest 
assumption that exists between management and its owners (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2003) which necessitates the board’s monitoring to minimise agency 
costs. It further suggests that attributes such as board independence are 
contributory factors towards enhancing effectiveness of board structures 
and functions. Many prior studies concluded that the increasing number of 
independent directors’ have enhanced board governance and effectiveness 
(Annuar and Abdul rashid 2015; Armstrong, Core and Guay 2014; Bliss, 
Muniandy and Majid, 2007; Germain et al., 2014; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013; Haniffa and Cooke, 2000; Kamardin, 2011; McNulty, florackis and 
ormrod, 2012). However, agency theory’s shortcoming remains its over 
simplification in conceptualising the conflict of interest notwithstanding 
studies that have highlighted that the increasing number of independent 
directors do not enhance board effectiveness (Westphal, 2002; Nadler, 2004; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). 
 
stewardship theory opines that managers are predominantly 
trustworthy and are good custodians of the resources entrusted to their 
care, thereby eradicating agency related costs (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003) 
and are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). Thus, managers should be fully empowered in the firm’s 
administration as they are deemed good stewards of the resources entrusted in 
them (Letza, sun and Kirkbride, 2004). The stewardship theory’s proponents 
further assert that stewardship behaviour is organisationally focused and 
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hence its advocates are of the view that better financial performance is more 
likely to be associated with internal corporate governance principles that 
enable managers’ greater empowerment.
However, resource dependence theory is not in favour of the other 
theories whereby it posits that companies depend on one another to 
acquire the requisite resources such as technology or capital and therefore 
interdependent relationships are formed (Pfeffer and salancik, 1978; 
Brettel and Moss, 2013). Moreover, it is further assumed that multiple 
firms will create and maintain social relationships resulting in interlocking 
directorship.3 In such instances, better synergies, lower transaction costs 
and more positive strategic decision making which lead to better firm 
results (Williamson, 1984) are expected, including beneficial relationships 
for all the interdependent firms. Therefore, within the resource dependency 
theory framework, boards with high levels of connections to the external 
environment would facilitate accessibility to valuable resources and 
strengthening of risk management and corporate governance practices and 
thereby improve firms’ overall performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).
organisational theorists found that the structure and activity of 
complex organisations was subject to the influence of many contextual 
and contingent variables and is the precursor to the contingency theory 
framework (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Chenhall, 2003). Prior risk management 
studies that had adopted the approach of contingency framework found that 
the dependence of risk management performance, outcomes and practices 
are dependent on organisational context and therefore varies from firm 
to firm (Chenhall, 2003). However, recent studies suggest a dearth of 
inconclusive results based on the longitudinal field studies, which posit that 
risk management practices and processes vary from firm settings, industry, 
social settings, as well as external and competitive environments (Beasley, 
Clune and Hermanson, 2005; Mikes A., 2009; Mikes A., 2011). Therefore, 
the main challenge of the contingency theory remains as the need for more 
focused research for the theory to mature, given that contingency theory 
and risk governance are both evolving disciplines.
3 Interlocking directorship occurs when the directors are members of two different boards for which 
they have relationships.
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The Principles on risk Management and the Board’s risk 
Oversight Responsibilities
Risk is a pervasive and inherent component of every firm’s organisational 
strategy. Coupled with the complexity of business transactions, globalisation 
and technological advances; these have heightened the complexities of 
risks. Prior researches suggest that while much have been published on 
enterprise risk management, ambiguity remains and hence led to continuous 
evolvement on what constitutes enterprise risk management (As/NZs 
4360 risk Management standard, 1995; Coso, 2004; Iso 31000, 2010; 
The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2016; rIMs, The risk Management 
society, 2016). Given the multi-disciplinary nature of risks, researchers have 
identified the need for a more integrated manner of treating risks (Kloman, 
1992; shapiro and Titman, 2005; D’Arcy and Brogan, 2001) and have led 
to a more formal establishment of framework to deal with risk management 
such as Iso31000. The focus of Iso31000 has resulted in ongoing empirical 
studies on risk management and factors contributing to its effectiveness, for 
which various factors have been studied and results remain mixed. However, 
there remain limited studies on the detailed processes of risk management 
undertaken by board i.e. its risk oversight responsibilities hence motivating 
this particular study.
Risk Oversight Responsibilities
The board’s main responsibility is its monitoring role and the need to 
exercise greater oversight over the firm’s risk-taking and risk management 
activities to protect stakeholder value. risk oversight encompasses practices 
adopted by the board to ensure that firms implement a robust mechanism 
for the purposes of identifying, prioritising, coordinating, executing, and 
managing the activities of the firm in order to minimise the impact of 
unwanted risk on desired outcomes. Through the risk oversight process, 
the board is then expected to obtain clear understanding of the risks 
inherent in the firm’s corporate strategy, risk philosophy and risk appetite 
in executing its strategy, as well as being made aware of the organisational 
or management dysfunctional behaviour(s) that can lead to excessive 
risk taking. In such instances, the board is able to provide timely input to 
management on such critical risk issues. The board’s risk oversight role is 
typically assisted through the formation of sub-committees such as Audit 
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Committee (“AC”) or the rMC. Therefore, the board needs to holistically 
ensure that the role of risk and governance oversight of each committee is 
adequate to provide assurance to the board’s overall responsibility of risk 
and governance oversight. 
Board Effectiveness and Corporate Risk Governance
Malaysia’s ongoing improvement to the corporate governance agenda 
includes the enhancement of board’s effectiveness on risk management 
oversight responsibilities. Board’s effectiveness is interpreted as a function 
of its contribution towards organisational performance, processes, and the 
board’s support of the organisation and its dynamics in carrying out its 
responsibilities (Ingley and Van der Walt, 2003). Earlier studies (Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2003; Nuryanah and Islam, 2011; McNulty et al., 2012; shukeri 
et al., 2012) have postulated that board effectiveness can be deduced as the 
outcome of the board’s structure and responsibility although there remain 
mixed opinions. Thus, this study intends to determine the board structure 
and responsibilities that enable effective board oversight on corporate 
risk governance and to supplement gaps from existing studies amongst 
Malaysian listed firms.
The structure and responsibility of the board can be assessed based 
on the following perspectives:
Board composition and its independence. Board independence is 
assessed based on the ratio of independent directors present on a board 
and the need for independence is achieved by ensuring that the roles of the 
CEo and the chairman are segregated. Earlier studies found that external 
directors are perceived to be more independent and hence objective when 
compared to insider directors (John and senbet, 1998; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2000; Ayuso and Argandona, 2007; Kamardin and Haron, 2011; Germain 
et al., 2014), which lend support to the agency theorists. studies also found 
that in Malaysian government-linked entities or family-owned corporations, 
the role of independent directors may however be influenced (Annuar and 
Abdul rashid, 2015). Conversely, prior studies also found that composition 
of the board such as the CEo’s duality role and board experience may not 
be directly linked with improving overall board governance effectiveness 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000; Guest, 2008; McNulty et al., 2012; shukeri 
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et al., 2012) supporting the stewardship theory perspective. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis states:
H1: Board structures characterised by higher number of non-executive 
directors has a significant relationship towards the effectiveness of 
board’s oversight on corporate risk governance.
Board committee structure. Boards are typically made up of several 
sub-committees to assist the board in carrying out its requisite roles and 
responsibilities. studies have found that the formation of sub-committees 
enhanced overall governance effectiveness (Maassen, 2002; subramaniam 
et al., 2009; Petri and Soublin, 2010). Moreover, the significance of the 
AC’s role in instituting governance even in instances of CEo duality has 
also been noted (Carcello, Hermanson and Ye, 2011). Additionally, given 
the increasing importance and complexity of risk management, this has 
also warranted the formation of rMC (De Lacy, 2005; Yatim, 2009) as 
promulgated by international codes (securities Commission Malaysia, 
2012; singapore Corporate Governance Committee, 2012; financial 
reporting Council, 2014) albeit studies that have yielded mixed results 
on the benefits of RMC in enhancing overall risk governance (Minton et 
al., 2014; Amoozegar, Pukthuanthong and Walker, 2017). Therefore, the 
second hypothesis states:
H2: Board structures characterised by the existence of AC/rMC has a 
significant positive relationship towards the effectiveness of board’s 
oversight on corporate risk governance. 
Board Experience and skills. Board faces a myriad of responsibilities 
and therefore the expertise and experience of the board is closely mapped 
to the firm’s needs (Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004). Earlier studies have found that directors with accounting, finance 
or economics skills tend to be more effective in governance and risk 
management (Dionne and Triki, 2005; Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 
2014; Clements, Neill and Wertheim, 2015; Ittner and Keusch, 2015). In 
a Malaysian study, financial competency was noted as the most important 
board competency affecting firm performance (Wan Yusoff and Armstrong, 
2012). Hence, this study attempts to assess if directors with relevant skills 
and experience enhance the board’s overall oversight effectiveness of 
corporate risk governance. Therefore, the third hypothesis states:
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H3: Board with directors possessing accounting, economic, financial 
or risk management expertise and skills has a significant positive 
relationship towards the effectiveness of board’s oversight on corporate 
risk governance.
Corporate reporting and Disclosure. A key principle of corporate 
reporting is to ensure that companies continue to create long-term 
sustainable value. Therefore, improvement in the quality of corporate 
reporting is viewed as an extended agenda of corporate risk governance. 
Corporate reporting includes disclosure of financial information and any 
other information relevant for communicating with its shareholders. While 
Bursa’s listing requirements stipulate that disclosure on the statement of 
risk management and internal control is mandatory in the annual report, 
the extent, depth and details of disclosure remain voluntary. Prior studies 
have suggested that governance and risk management mechanisms could 
potentially improve or decrease the levels of disclosures for corporate 
reporting and are dependent on the board’s composition (Donnnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). Therefore, the fourth and fifth hypotheses are:
H4: Boards that have established and disclosed risk management framework 
have a significant positive relationship towards the effectiveness of 
the board’s oversight on corporate risk governance. 
H5: Boards that have adopted detailed reporting and disclosure of 
governance and risk management practices and processes have a 
significant positive relationship towards the effectiveness of board’s 
oversight on corporate risk governance.
Dynamic and constructive dialogues on risk management and corporate 
governance practices. Corporate governance and risk management practices 
are lynchpins in many organisations and increasingly important. on the 
same token, while corporate governance and risk management disclosures 
have improved, there remains a strong argument to ensure that the practice 
is one grounded on substance over form. Hence, as part of this study, survey 
questionnaires will be used to ascertain the dynamism of the board in 
discussing matters in relation to corporate governance and risk management, 
strategising and formulating the organisation’s risk appetite, reviewing and 
approving of action plans required to address key risks and governance 
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issues, and thereafter monitoring the effectiveness of its corporate risk and 
governance initiatives. Therefore, the sixth hypothesis states:
H6: Boards that are involved in dynamic and constructive dialogues on risk 
management and corporate governance practices have a significant 
positive relationship towards the effectiveness of board’s oversight 
on corporate risk governance. 
rESEArCH DESIGN
Sample Selection
samples for this study were selected from the top 100 public listed 
companies on Bursa Malaysia over five financial years from 2011 to 2015. 
The rationale for selecting the top 100 public listed companies is largely 
attributed to prior studies that indicated that efforts of risk management 
and governance are more genuine and valuable in large firms. Furthermore, 
the market capitalisation of the top 100 listed companies constitutes 77% 
(rM1,310 billion) of Bursa Malaysia’s total market capitalisation of 
rM1,695 billion (Bursa Malaysia, 2015). Additionally, given the MCCG 
revision in 2012, data of post-2012 are a useful indicator to examine the 
effects of post adoption of additional risk management and governance 
requirements. Data for this study were collected from annual reports that 
were available from the Bursa Malaysia website, as well as survey data 
from survey questionnaire that were distributed to chairman of the top 
100 Bursa listed companies. The purpose of the survey questionnaire 
was to better understand the processes adopted by the board on its risk 
governance oversight responsibilities. The questionnaire contained 13 
questions whereby responses were solicited using the Likert-type scale.4 
Those 13 questions covered eight key areas (i.e. risk appetite statement, 
risk management framework, dedication risk management function, risk 
discussion, monitoring of risk process, sharing of risk information, risk 
oversight, and board effectiveness self-assessment) prepared and adapted 
based on the review of prior studies on board oversight and related processes 
4 Likert scale ranging from 1 = “No Emphasis”, 2 = “Low Emphasis”, 3 = “Average Emphasis”, 
4 = “Above Average Emphasis” and 5 = “High Emphasis” as well as measures for frequency 
of discussions on Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = “Quarterly”, 2 = “2-3 times a year”, 3 = 
“Annually”, 4 = “Less than once a year” and 5 = “Not at all”.
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(finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Nadler, 2004; raber, 2003; sobel and 
reding, 2004; Kiel and Nicholson, 2005; Md Kassim, Ishak and Abdul 
Manaf, 2013; Barton and Wiseman, 2015). 
Operationalisation and Measurement of Variables
This study assessed six independent variables: (a) board composition 
(“INDIr”), (b) board committee structures (“CoMM”), (c) board experience 
and skills (“QUAL”), (d) implementation and disclosure of risk management 
framework (“DIsC”), (e) boards that have adopted detailed reporting and 
disclosure of governance and risk management practices and processes 
(“rPT”), and (f) dynamic and constructive dialog (“rPD and rAs”). To 
ascertain the effectiveness of board’s oversight on corporate risk governance, 
three variables that measure the firm’s financial performance and market 
value were used i.e. the return on Asset (“roA”), return on Equity 
(“ROE”) for financial performance and Tobin’s Q score for measuring 
market value, as a proxy measure of a board’s effectiveness on corporate risk 
governance. The rationale for using three variables is based on prior studies, 
which suggest that there is a positive correlation between firm performance 
(as measured by Tobin’s Q, roA and roE) and governance scores/index 
(Black, Jung and Kim, 2004; Habbash and Bajaher, 2014; Ramadan, 2014; 
Vo and Nguyen, 2014; Wang, 2015; Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla and smith, 
2015). The Tobin’s Q, roA and roE formula used is as below:
Tobin’s Q =
Market capitalisation1 + book value of debt
Book value of total assets
ROA =
Net Profit
ROE =
Net Profit
Book value of total assets Shareholder’s Equity
rESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Analysis of results 
The descriptive statistics are explored and discussed in the following 
table. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Tested for 2011 and 2015
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation
 2011 2015 2011 2015 2011 2015 2011 2015
INDIR 28.57% 30.00% 75.00% 85.71% 45.78% 49.00% 11.01% 11.55%
COMM 0 0 1 1 0.24 0.46 0.429 0.501
QUAL 12.50% 9.09% 90.91% 90.00% 44.47% 45.64% 20.52% 18.76%
DISC 0.0 0 1 1 0.14 0.31 0.35 0.47
RPT 0.0 0 1 1 0.10 0.33 0.31 0.47
Tobin’s Q 0.27 0.61 9.82 13.81 1.83 2.12 1.69 10.48
ROA −0.46 −3.61 45.89 73.07 9.13 8.32 8.27 10.48
ROE −0.71 −8.11 156.07 285.78 20.31 20.39 20.65 35.30
Sample Size 88 100
Table 2: Results of t-test for Corporate Risk Governance Indicators, 
Firm Performance and Firm Valuation Variables for Comparison 
of Mean Values for 2011 and 2015
2011 2015
Variables M SD M SD t-test
INDIR 0.458 0.110 0.489 0.117 −1.845
COMM 0.238 0.429 0.466 0.502 −3.239*
QUAL 0.445 0.205 0.465 0.193 −0.653
DISC 0.136 0.345 0.340 0.477 −3.489*
RPT 0.102 0.305 0.375 0.487 −4.255*
ROA 9.135 8.266 7.886 10.607 −.027
ROE 20.315 20.650 20.442 37.260 −.824
Tobin’s Q 1.832 1.690 2.049 2.130 −.679
      * p < .005, N=88
Board’s Oversight Effectiveness. Board’s oversight effectiveness is 
represented by proxy value of firm performance i.e. Tobin’s Q, ROA and 
roE. The results of the descriptive statistics (in Table 1) indicated that the 
mean value for roA decreased, roE increased and Tobin’s Q increased, 
though the t-test (in Table 2) indicated that the respective increases and 
decrease as not statistically significant at p < 0.005. Separately, it is noted that 
the highest point of mean values for all three dependent variables occurred 
in 2013 as shown in figure 1, which was a year post implementation of the 
MCCG 2012. This could possibly be attributed to the market’s reaction of 
improvements in governance principles adopted by Malaysian firms and 
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thereby improvements in firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
roA and roE. 
Figure 1: Summary of Movements in the Mean 
Values of Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE from 2011 to 2015
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Board Composition and Board’s Oversight Effectiveness. Companies 
studied increased the number of independent directors (INDIr) in 
compliance to MCCG 2012. This is reflected by the increase in the mean 
value of 45.8% in 2011 to 48.9% in 2015, though the t-test indicated that the 
mean difference was not statistically significant at p < 0.005 as summarised 
in Table 2. furthermore, the relationships predicted in the Pearson’s 
correlation (see Table 3) and analysis of variance (Table 4) provided no 
statistically significant evidence to suggest that relationship between board 
composition as represented by the number of independent directors to 
board’s oversight effectiveness exists. Hence, the results provided evidence 
to reject H1 are consistent to recent studies (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
Erkens, Hung and Matos, 2012; Pan, 2013; Zemzem and Kacem, 2014).
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This is however in contrast with earlier studies which suggest a 
significant relationship of board independence and effectiveness of board’s 
oversight (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Abdullah, 2004). Notwithstanding the 
lack of statistically significant relationship in this study, the regression results 
indicated negative beta coefficient of independent directors and Tobin’s Q, 
roA and roE, which is consistent to recent studies that suggest an inverse 
relationship of the increasing the number of independent directors and its 
impact on firm’s operating performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Dar, 
Naseem, rehman and Niazi, 2011; Erkens et al., 2012). It is also further 
observed that Pearson’s correlation was positive in 2011 albeit insignificant 
(see Table 3), but subsequently became negative in 2015, following the 
implementation of the MCCG 2012 (see Table 3).
Board Committees and Board’s oversight Effectiveness. The number 
of companies adopting board committees (“CoMM”) increased from the 
mean value of 0.238 in 2011 to 0.466 in 2015. Additionally, the t-test as 
summarised in Table 2 reported that the mean difference was a statistically 
significant increase in the establishment and presence of RMC and combined 
AC and rMC by the companies sampled between 2011 and 2015. Based on 
the correlation analysis, board committee was reported to have a significant 
relationship with roA albeit a negative relationship in 2011 and for the 
cumulative period (see Table 3). However, no significant relationship was 
reported in 2015 based on Pearson’s correlation analysis (see Table 3). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of variance reported that there is statistically 
significant relationship with ROA with F-statistics 6.134 (p = 0.015, < 
0.05) for 2011 and f-statistics 14.540 (p = 0.000, < 0.01) for cumulative 
period as summarised in Table 4. Therefore, the results provided evidence to 
support H2. This is consistent to prior research that AC (Wild, 1996; Laing 
and Weir, 1999; Ismail, Iskandar and rahmat, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara and Nagel, 2012) and rMCs (Hoyt 
and Liebenberg, 2011; Tao and Hutchinson, 2013) support the significant 
relationships. In contrast, there has been a number of past studies suggesting 
that board committees were not associated with firm’s corporate governance 
practices, firm performance and valuation, and thereby effectiveness of 
board’s oversight on corporate risk governance (Menon and Williams, 2001; 
Leng, 2004; Beasley et al., 2005; Puni, 2015). Therefore, the impact of 
board committee is an important mechanism in ensuring the effectiveness of 
board’s oversight in Malaysia against the backdrop of challenging economic, 
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political and social-political environments. However, the results above 
also indicated a negative relationship between board committee structure 
specifically RMC and effectiveness of board’s oversight. A similar negative 
relationship was also noted in a recent study in Tunisia (Zemzem and Kacem, 
2014), and a possible reason for the negative relationship albeit a significant 
one could be attributed to the study’s sample size.
Board Experience and Skills and Board’s Oversight Effectiveness. 
There is a marginal increase in the percentage of board experience and 
skills (QUAL) from the mean value of 44.5% in 2011 to 46.5% in 2015. 
The t-test results indicate no significant differences in the scores for 2011 
as summarised in Table 2. Additionally, the relationships predicted in 
the Pearson’s correlation results (see Table 3) and analysis of variance 
provided no statistically significant evidence (see Table 4) to suggest that 
a relationship between board experience and skills as represented by the 
number of directors with requisite skills and experience in accounting, 
economic, financial or risk management to any proxy values of effectiveness 
of board’s oversight exists. Hence, there are sufficient evidence to reject H3. 
This is consistent to other prior studies (Anderson, Mansi and reeb, 2004; 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006) as well as those focusing specifically 
on Malaysian firms (Yatim, 2009; Kallamu, 2015) as opposed to prior 
studies which found a significant relationship between the board/director’s 
financial knowledge and their ability to effectively manage a firm’s risk and 
governance both amongst Malaysian firms (Johl, Kaur and Cooperis, 2015) 
and those of other developing economies (Dionne and Triki, 2005; Arioglu 
and Tuan, 2014). A plausible reason for the lack of statistical significant 
relationship supports the resource dependency theory whereby for boards 
to be effective in their oversight responsibilities, it would require other 
skills and experience beyond that of accounting, finance, economics or risk 
management but those specifically in relation to the respective industries for 
which the firms operate in (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Marlin 
and Geiger, 2012). 
Corporate Reporting and Board’s Oversight Effectiveness. The 
number of companies embarking on corporate reporting of risk management 
framework (rPT) increased from the mean value of 0.136 in 2011 to 0.340 in 
2015, while corporate reporting on detailed reporting and disclosure of risk 
management practices and processes (DIsC) increased from the mean value 
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of 0.102 in 2011 and 0.375 in 2015. Based on the t-test on DIsC, there is a 
significant difference in the scores for 2011 and 2015. Likewise, the t-test 
for RPT indicates a significant difference in the scores for 2011 and 2015 
as shown in Table 2. Based on the correlation analysis, rPT was reported 
to have a significant positive relationship with ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q 
for cumulative period (see Table 3). However, no significant relationship 
was reported in 2011 and 2015. Additionally, the analysis of variance and 
regression results indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between rPT with Tobin’s Q and roA but not roE. separately, based on 
the correlation analysis, DISC was reported to have a significant negative 
relationship with ROA for 2011 (see Table 3). However, no significant 
relationship was reported for cumulative period and 2015. Additionally, 
the analysis of variance and regression results also reported that there 
is statistically significant relationship with Tobin’s Q and ROA but not 
significant with ROE (see Table 4). Therefore, the results of the statistical 
analysis provided evidence to support H4 and H5. There are however some 
studies which have indicated that reporting and disclosure of governance 
and risk management framework alone have no conclusive impact of firm 
performance or effectiveness of board’s oversight on governance (Quona, 
Zeghal and Maingot, 2012). other prior studies have also indicated a positive 
impact on firm performances, especially for firms that have adopted and 
embedded detailed risk management and governance practices into their 
practices and processes (Gordon, Loeb and Tseng, 2009; Pagach and Warr, 
2011; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Miihkinen, 2012). 
Corporate Risk Governance Process and Board’s Oversight 
Effectiveness. Based on the questionnaire data, the results of the reliability 
measures with the Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.896 indicated that the 
required levels of reliability have been achieved. The factorability of the 
eight items were examined and noted to be correlated at least 0.3. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-olkin measure is 0.670 and the Bartlett’s test of spherity is 
highly significant (p < 0.001), confirming that factor analysis is appropriate 
for the survey data collected. Additionally, the communalities as summarised 
in Appendix A are all greater than 0.5. The factor analysis using principal 
component analysis with Varimax (orthogonal) rotation resulted in two 
factors that explained 78.50% of the variance for the variables studied. The 
two factors identified were “process of risk and governance discussion and 
oversight” (“rPD”), which explained 63.29% and “risk appetite statement” 
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(“rAs”) with 15.22% of the variances respectively. for the process of risk 
and governance discussion and oversight factor, there were high loadings 
for frequent discussions on risk and governance, monitoring of risk and 
governance related processes, as well as having the board frequently perform 
self-assessment of its risk oversight role and responsibilities. These loadings 
were subsequently used to operationalise the testing of H6 using variables 
rPD and rAs. Based on the correlation analysis, there was no statistically 
significant relationship reported between RPD and RAS with Tobin’s Q, 
roA or roE as summarised in Table 5. The multiple regression analysis 
and analysis of variance also did not indicate any statistically significant 
relationship (see Tables 6 and 7). Therefore, the results provide evidence 
to reject H6. The results of this study contradict with prior studies on risk 
governance (which focuses on the risk and governance practices adopted 
by the firm) and its impact on firm performance (Mat Rahim, Mahat, Md. 
Nassir and Yahya, 2015; Rudnyckyj, 2014; Teoh and Muthuveloo, 2015) 
though the studies remain limited thus far.
Table 5: Pearson Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables
rPD rAS Tobin’s Q 2015 ROA 2015 ROE 2015
RPD 1.000
RAS −0.279 1.000
Tobin’s Q 2015 0.229 0.091 1.000
ROA 2015 0.262 0.171 0.893** 1.000
ROE 2015 0.132 0.122 0.895** 0.888** 1.000
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
Table 6: Multiple Regression Analysis of Variance for Independent 
Variables RPD and RAS and Each Dependent Variable
 f Sig r r2 Adjusted r2
Standard Error 
of the Estimate
Tobin’s 
Q
0.725 0.499 0.280 0.079 0.000 2.1629
ROE 0.397 0.678 0.211 0.045 0.000 64.2830
ROA 1.309 0.296 0.365 0.133 0.031 8.2810
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Table 7: Analysis of Variance for Effectiveness 
of Corporate Risk Governance between RPD and RAS
Dependent Variable Independent Variable 2015
f Sig.
ROE RPD 0.277 0.938
ROA RPD 0.228 0.960
Tobin’s Q RPD 0.175 0.979
ROE RAS 0.312 0.736
ROA RAS 1.878 0.183
Tobin’s Q RAS 0.435 0.654
Data from the questionnaire also provided useful insights in the study 
of board practices and processes. About 82% of the respondents indicated 
that boards retain the overall responsibility of corporate risk oversight and 
86% discussed and approved the risk appetite statement. furthermore, 
57% of the respondents also discussed the risk management framework 
and methodology and its organisational impact on a quarterly basis while 
another 29% did so on an annual basis. Apart from that, 83% further 
indicated that the board has regular quarterly risk management discussions 
on emerging risks, key strategic risks, and its corresponding action plans 
with management. on a quarterly basis, boards would typically share high 
level summary of top risks and summary of emerging risks while on an 
annual basis, summary of exceptions and scenario analysis for risk planning 
would be presented. furthermore, 80% indicated that there is an above 
average emphasis of effective monitoring of the risk management process. 
To facilitate board monitoring responsibilities, 86% of the respondents 
indicated that they were supported by a dedicated risk management function 
of which 50% reported to the CEo. The respondents also highlighted the 
challenges they faced in their risk governance oversight responsibilities. 
60% indicated lack of commitment due to overriding priorities as inhibitors 
to their risk oversight responsibilities; possibly attributed by directors who 
sit on multiple boards. other challenges indicated include lack of guidance, 
awareness, and training in the areas of risk management. Nevertheless, 80% 
respondents viewed the current corporate risk oversight and governance as 
either “effective” or “highly effective”, while the remaining 20% suggested 
that “some improvements” may be required. The respondents further added 
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that the board periodically undertakes self-assessment of its risk oversight 
effectiveness. other than that, 60% of the respondents do so annually while 
the remaining 40% do so on a quarterly basis. In summary, the majority of 
boards are actively involved in the risk governance process of approving 
their risk appetite statement and risk framework and methodology, actively 
and regularly monitoring the risks and governance matters, as well as to 
undertake health check of its own effectiveness vis-à-vis its oversight role 
on risk governance in spite of concerns raised on overriding priorities being 
a key concern of the board’s oversight effectiveness of risk governance. 
Hence, on a holistic basis, there may still be grounds to support the 
theoretical perspective of contingency theory requiring boards to delve into 
the industry/organisation specific risk management discussions, articulate 
the specific implications and consequence of each actions, and the outcomes 
are in fact more effective in their oversight role; an area for further research.
CONCLUSION
The study’s purpose was premised on exploring attributes and determinants 
of board structure and responsibilities that will contribute towards the 
effectiveness of board’s oversight role on corporate risk governance. 
Attributes such as board committee structures, boards that have established 
and disclosure its risk management framework and board’s disclosure 
of detailed risk and governance practices and processes were found to 
contribute significantly towards the effectiveness of board’s oversight 
on risk governance amongst Malaysian listed companies supporting the 
tenets of agency theory. However, this study also found that the board’s 
independence, its skills and experience, and its involvement in dynamic and 
constructive dialogues on risk management and governance do not have 
any significance on improving effectiveness of board’s oversight supporting 
the resource dependency theory. This study also indicated insufficient 
evidence that Malaysian boards are involved in dynamic and constructive 
dialogues on risk management and corporate governance practices, such as 
frequent discussions on risk and governance (at least on a quarterly basis), 
monitoring of risk and governance related processes through the quarterly 
risk reporting of risk management progress and on-going self-assessment, 
are positively related to the effectiveness of the board’s oversight on 
corporate risk governance.
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As the study on corporate risk governance remains an emerging 
focus, this study attempts to close the research gap on the determinants that 
will enhance the Malaysian board’s oversight effectiveness on corporate 
risks governance. This study contributes to the collective knowledge 
and insights on: (a) corporate risk governance and how board committee 
should be structured, (b) the quality of its corporate reporting disclosures, 
and the practices and processes adopted by the board on risk management 
matters that can affect firm performance given the challenging operating 
environment experience in Malaysia during the period (i.e. 2011 to 2015) 
of the study, (c) importance of integrating governance and risk management 
as part of a firm’s risk and governance culture, and (d) improvements to 
board’s continuous education programme specifically on risk management. 
In conclusion, the board’s oversight responsibilities on risk governance 
remains a relatively nascent role for Malaysian boards and progress 
continues to be made including the ongoing review of risk and governance 
reforms. Therefore, while the findings of this study have limitations and 
mixed results consistent with prior studies, the findings are nevertheless 
insightful and could help regulators move their agenda forward, especially 
in providing clarity on the practices and processes of integrating risk 
management and governance. This includes in-depth awareness of principles 
of risk management which enables a board to participate in a more in-depth 
and regular basis on risk related matters of balancing the firm’s objective 
of sustainable and profitable growth against the risks it needs to undertake 
while improving overall shareholder’s value.
LIMITATION Of THE STUDY
An inherent limitation of this study is the scope which is focused mainly 
on the top 100 listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. Hence, while the data 
represent a statistically relevant sample of Malaysian listed companies, 
the findings of the study and the observations thereon are only limited to 
Malaysian firms. 
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APPENDIX A
Factor Analysis Table for Dynamic and Constructive Dialogues on Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance Practices
Loadings
Component 1: Process 
of Risk & Governance 
Discussion and Oversight
Component 2: 
risk Appetite 
Statement
Frequently have risk and governance 
discussions 0.909
Monitoring of the risk and governance 
related processes 0.883
Effectiveness of board risk oversight 0.789
Discussion of risk management 
methodology 0.754
Board frequently perform self- 
assessment on risk oversight role 0.752
Discussion of top key risks 0.687
Discussion and approval of risk 
appetite statement 0.949
Frequently discusses and assesses 
risk appetite statement −0.922
Eigenvalue 5.063 1.218
% of Total Variance 63.285 15.219
Total Variance 78.504%
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